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compare the Thessalians in the Peloponnesian War (431-404) (see 6.3); or the Sicilian and South
Italian city-states (415-413) (see 7.2).
II. Belligerents are not to recruit combatants in neutral territory (ART. 4); neutrals have an obligation to prevent such
recruitment (ART. 5); compare the Corcyraean speech in 433 (3.3.C); the Theban decree ca. 383 (8.4.B); Greek
regulation of service for Persia and other belligerent states (389-344) (9.3).
III. Neutrals can allow the passage of individuals bound for belligerent states, the export of goods (even military) to
belligerent states, the conduct of business by belligerents within their territory (ART. 6, 7, 8); but whatever is allowed to
one belligerent must be allowed to the other (ART. 9); compare the Corcyraean speech in 433 (5.3.C); Argos during the
Archidamian War (431-421) (6.1); Plataea in 429 (6.3); Corcyra in 427 (6.5); the Sicilian and South Italian city-states
(415-413) (7.2-3); small states in the Corinthian War (395-386) (8.3.C-D).
IV. Defense of neutrality, even by force, cannot be regarded as an act of hostility (ART. 10); compare Corcyra in 427
(6.5); the Sicilian and South Italian city-states (431-421) (6.2); (415-413) (7.2-3); and Athens in 379 (8.4.C).
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V. Individuals cannot take advantage of their neutrality to commit hostile acts against a belligerent
without liability to severe punishment (ART. 17); compare the execution of Pollis of Argos in 429
(6.6); the Persian demand for the recall of Chabrias in 379 and of Chares in the 350s (9.3.B).
Naturally, there are noteworthy differences. Provisions for handling the wounded (ART. 14-15),
the status of "native populations" within neutral states (ART. 16), and the requisition of railway
property (ART. 19) have no ancient parallels. Nor is there any ancient parallel for the concept of
internment (ART. 11-13) or the idea of establishing precedent through the publication of the decisions
of prize courts established to adjudicate the disputes between belligerent and neutral parties (ART. 3
and 4 of those relating specifically to neutrality).[10] During the classical period, however, belligerents
normally respected the right of neutral merchants to travel without restriction.[11] Nevertheless, true
juridical treatment of the rights of neutral shipping appears to have come only during the Hellenistic
period, with the widespread acceptance of the Rhodian sea law.[12]
The rules just enumerated applied to states that were seeking to be recognized as uncommitted
bystanders during periods of warfare. While recognition could come as the result of a unilateral
declaration, in many cases it was achieved through negotiation between the would-be neutrals and the
belligerents. When negotiation was the means of recognition, the strongest support came from
bilateral treaties, since neutrality could be bolstered by existing agreements that either dictated that a
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certain state would adhere to a neutral policy in certain circumstances or conceded the option of
neutrality more generally. For instance, the Argives cited their treaty with Sparta at the outbreak of
the Peloponnesian War (see 6.1), the Achaeans their philia with both sides (ibid .), and the
[10] Nevertheless, these are differences in practice more than conception. I hope to show in a further
study that the similarity of accepted practice as well as principle is not a matter of chance but a result
of the strong influence of classical precedent on the formulation in the sixteenth to eighteenth century
of international law dealing with neutrality.
[11] See, for example, Jacoby, FGH 328, Philochorus frag. 162, on Philip's respect for neutral
commerce (9.5.B); though see also Thuc. 2. 67; 3. 32 on the Spartans' violation of the rights of
neutral merchants (see 6.6 above).
[12] See Jados, Consulate of the Sea , xii, 191-94, no. 276; W. Ashburner, Rhodian Sea Law (Oxford,
1909).
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Camarinaeans their symmachia with both sides (see 7.2). Until 389 Aegina appears to have had an
agreement with Athens approved by the Spartans (see 8.3.D), and several Peloponnesian states may
have claimed opposing agreements in defense of their neutrality in the conflict between Athens and
Philip II (see 9.5.A).
Formal diplomatic connections obviously strengthened the position of neutrals; and indeed,
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